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BOOK REVIEWS
By Joel Paschal.* Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xii, 267. $4.00.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND.

A recurring problem in the field of constitutional law is to determine the meaning of various provisions of the Constitution as applied
to continually changing conditions. Some maintain that the Constitution means what the judges say it means. Others contend that the
framers of the Constitution dictate the decisions in constitutional cases.
Comes now the author with still another and even more novel rationalization: the Constitution meant, at least for George Sutherland, what
Herbert Spencer would say it meant. If any central theme unites the
various phases of Sutherland's career, to Mr. Paschal that theme is
the Spencerian dialectics. In his words, "Sutherland walked in the
shadow of Herbert Spencer."' The author goes to great lengths to
demonstrate that Sutherland's every action was motivated by an attempt
to conform to this particular school of social thought. Indeed, the
sequence of the Sutherland story has been conveniently arranged to
emphasize this belief. The first chapter is entitled "The Development
of an Idea," and that idea is Spencerianism and laissez faire. 2 The
second chapter, entitled "Misgivings," relates to Sutherland's experiences in Congress. 3 The chapter title was necessitated by Sutherland's
indorsement of certain measures which indicate a wavering from the
philosophical niche into which the author has placed him. 4 "Consecration," chapter three, is concerned with policies and developments of the
Wilson administration which convinced Sutherland of the validity of
his basic tenets. 5 "Application," chapter four, tells the story of how
Sutherland and his conservative brethren on the Supreme Court planted
* Executive Secretary, North Carolina judicial Society. Member of the North
Carolina Bar.
1. P. 15.
2. Pp. 3-36.
3. Pp. 37-81.
4. E.g., Sutherland, while in Congress, championed such measures as the Employer's Liability Act, the Pure Food and Drug Act, the eight hour day for federal
employees, the Children's Bureau, the Postal Savings System and Workmen's Compensation. The author does not make clear what Herbert Spencer would think of these
measures!
5. Pp. 82-114.
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laissez faire into the Constitution. 6 "Overthrow," chapter five, treats
of the iniquitous "New Deal" era, in which Sutherland saw his theories
crumble before the onslaught of a constitutional revolution necessitated
7
by the extreme circumstances of the time.
In order to determine the validity of the author's premise, it would
be helpful to state briefly the essentials of Spencerian dialectics and
how Sutherland became imbued therewith. Basically, Spencer's philosophy embodied two concepts: (1) evolution and adaptation; (2)
liberty. If left to his own devices, man's nature was such that he
would adapt himself to every possible situation and thus overcome all
obstacles to a perfect society. To Spencer, that which encouraged
adaptation was good; that which prevented it was evil; therefore, society
should place only the most limited restrictions on man's conduct. The
role of the State was simply the settlement of disputes and the preservation of order. The idea of the survival of the fittest and the economic
laws of laissez faire were, of course, an inevitable result of this theory.
If we are to believe Mr. Paschal, this philosophy was imparted
to and remained an immutable truth for Sutherland by virtue of his
early exposure to three confirmed believers in Spencerianism. The
first, a Professor Maesar at Brigham Young University, was an
avowed believer, and concededly had a tremendous influence on young
Sutherland. The other two, Professors Campbell and Cooley of the
Michigan Law School, espoused constitutional and jurisprudential doctrines strikingly similar to Spencer's philosophy. That these three
persons were students of, and subscribed to, the philosophy of Spencer
cannot reasonably be denied. But nowhere does the author bring forth
any evidence that Sutherland himself ever studied Spencer, or for that
matter, even knew of his existence and place of eminence in the social
thinking of that day. Thus, it would appear that the author arrives
at his underlying theme through an application of the principle of guilt
by association. That his tutors were disciples is not sufficient to convince this reviewer that Sutherland was one of the faithful. While
recognizing the powers of pedagogical persuasion and the role that
experience and environment will inevitably play, one would like to think
that the college trained man, in Sutherland's day as well as at present,
is capable of formulating independent judgments. As one reviewer has
wisely observed, "one cannot wholly dismiss the possibility that Sutherland might have been as inescapably imprisoned by his ironclad tenets
6. Pp. 115-155.
7. Pp. 156-207.
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without such specialized impregnation. Others have cherished the
same assured persuasion without the awareness of titular priests." s
While a great part of the book treats of Sutherland's activity and
public service before his ascension to the high bench, this review will
deal entirely with his judicial decisions and with the author's treatment
thereof. When Sutherland was appointed by President Harding in
1922, he joined a court consisting of the recently appointed Chief
Justice Taft, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Sanford, Van Devanter,
M~cReynolds, and Butler. The latter three, along with Sutherland, were
destined to later become the "four horsemen" of New Deal fame.
Holmes, Taft, and Sanford were subsequently replaced by Cardozo,
Hughes, and Roberts. To these men were presented problems of import
such as few others have been called upon to decide. While irreconcilable differences of opinion were soon to develop, the Court was
pervaded by an air of intellectual tolerance. 9
Sutherland was generally recognized as having the most ability
among the conservatives.' 0 Consequently, he became their spokesman
and defender. During his sixteen year tenure on the court, he was
called upon to write 281 opinions for the majority; he recorded 27
separate dissents. His opinions covered every aspect of constitutional
law. Among the more significant was Adkins v. The Children's Hospital,"-where a statute providing for a minimum wage for women was
held unconstitutional. Sutherland argued that the provision was a
violation of that liberty of contract guaranteed by the due process clause.
By not considering the value of the services rendered, the provision was
tantamount to confiscation of the employer's property. In addition,
the statute treated women differently than men, and since Spencer
denounced inequality, Paschal concludes that this was enough to
convince Sutherland of the unsavory nature of this legislation. This
opinion, of course, is no longer law, having been overruled by West
2
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.'
8. Powell, Book Review, 65 HARV. L. REV. 894, 895 (1952).
9. Soon after Sutherland's appointment, Holmes wrote to Pollock: "The meetings
are pleasanter than I have ever known them." P. 115.
10. For an opposing view see PEARSON & ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 198 (1937):
"Justice Sutherland and Justice Van Devanter have much in common. Both are
extremely conservative, and both owe their conservatism to a Western pioneer era
which molded their youth. Both are ardent prohibitionists. Both are Old Guard Republicans. Both are courteous, likeable gentlemen, and both, in contrast to some of
their reactionary colleagues, get along perfectly with the liberal justices with whom
they are in frequent legal disagreement. But there is an outstanding difference between
the two men: Van Devanter has brains. Sutherland has not."
11. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
12. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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One of Sutherland's most notable opinions is that of Euclid v.
Ambler,'3 which remains today as the foundation upon which much
of our municipal law is based. The Village of Euclid, a suburb of
Cleveland, enacted a zoning ordinance which prevented the plaintiff
from developing his land for industrial purposes. Rejecting the contention that the ordinance deprived plaintiff of his property without
due process of law, Justice Sutherland wrote one of the most liberal
of all constitutional opinions:
While the meaning of constitutional guaranties never
varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract
to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. 14
Instead of accepting this opinion at its face value, and conceding
that Sutherland, like the Constitution, was capable of adapting to
changing conditions, the author proceeds to rationalize the opinion as
Sutherland's method of paying deference to Spencer. The argument
goes like this: The forbidden industrial plants would approximate
nuisances with a resulting deprivation to the residential properties;
since one of Spencer's principal concerns was the protection of the
individual in the enjoyment of his own possessions, the ordinance would
effectuate this end. The shallowness of this rationale becomes apparent
when it is remembered that the owner of land susceptible to industrial
development was more than somewhat deprived of the enjoyment of
his possessions by the ordinance. A more logical explanation of the
opinion would at least consider the fact that two divergent interests
had come into conflict, requiring a decision one way or the other, depending upon which interest, in the opinion of the Court, outweighed
the other. Mr. Paschal's misinterpretation, if such it be, would seem to
be a direct result of his categorization of Sutherland as an unwaivering
Spencerian. The author undoubtedly realized that to vindicate his basic
premise, it would be necessary to fit all of Sutherland's opinions into
their preordained mold. But it is often difficult, if not impossible, to
put a gallon of old wine into a new quart bottle.
In other cases, however, Sutherland was more strict in his interpretation of the due process clause. In Tyson v. Banton,15 the New
York legislature had forbidden resale of theatre tickets at a price
greater than fifty cents in excess of cost. Sutherland viewed his task
13. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14. Id. at 387.
15. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
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in this case to discover if the business involved was one of those
"affected with a public interest."

He concluded that the brokerage
business was a mere appendage of the theatre, and the public had little
interest in the sale of theatre tickets. The legislation was therefore
invalid. In a similar case, Ribnik v. McBride,:' New Jersey passed a
statute regulating the charges of employment agencies. Again Sutherland struck down the act, on the theory that the public interest in this
business was not such as to justify price control. The Court had not
yet reached the place where it was willing to let the legislature make
unchallenged determinations on these problems. Paschal's rationalization of this decision is typical: Sutherland, along with Spencer, knew
that the answer to a man seeking a job was adaptation, "just as it had
been for the pioneer in his struggle against the wilderness."' 7
Massachusetts v. Mellon,", which in effect precludes constitutional
challenge of federal expenditures, was another Sutherland decision
which was quite far-reaching and which remains controlling today.
Without the practical prohibition there erected, the federal fiscal policies
which in a large measure assisted the country in recovering from the
chaotic economic experiences of the '30's might never have been possible.
The effectiveness of the present day grant-in-aid program of federalstate relations depends upon the philosophy of the separation of powers
which Mr. Justice Sutherland so clearly enunciated in the Mellon case.' 9
Sutherland was also instrumental in developing personal liberties
to their present position of eminence. Two of his most important cases
in this field were Powell v. Alabama20 and Groslean v. American Press
Co. 2 1 In the Powell case the sixth amendment guarantee of the right
to counsel was held enforceable against the states when their procedures
violated "fundamental principles of liberty and justice."' 22 In the
16. 279 U.S. 350 (1928).
the Tyson and Ribnik cases.

Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), overruled both

17. P. 130.
18. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19. "Looking through forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is
merely that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and
will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked
to prevent. To do so would not be to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,
an authority which plainly we do not possess." Id. at 488.
20. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Another of Sutherland's contributions to civil liberties
was the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), which is now the leading
case on bias and prejudice at trial.
21. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
22. This decision has been qualified by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) and
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The absolute guarantee of counsel provided
by the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states only where counsel is necessary
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Grosiean case, Sutherland declared unconstitutional a Louisiana statute
which imposed a license tax on newspapers of over 20,000 circulation.
The issue was whether the tax amounted to an abridgment of the
freedom of the press. Sutherland concluded that the purpose of the
first amendment was to bar the adoption of any form of "previous
restraint" upon printed publications or their circulation. The net result
of the decision was to free the press from discriminatory taxation.
The decision which provoked Sutherland's most notable dissent
was the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case. 23 The legislature of
Minnesota had provided for a temporary stay of a creditor's right to
the foreclosure of his mortgage. The Constitution spoke in unequivocal
terms: "No state shall ... pass any.., law impairing the obligation of
any contract." 24 Throughout its history this provision had uniformly
been held to bar similar statutes. 25 Nevertheless, Hughes, C. J., held that
a "temporary restraint" was permissible if made necessary by a great
public calamity. This power, he was careful to say, was not created by
the emergency; rather the emergency furnished the occasion for its use.
Sutherland found it impossible to recognize the validity of the majority's
reasoning. To him, "[i]f the provisions of the constitution be not
upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well
26
be abandoned."
It is the author's treatment and discussion of this decision that
appears to be one of the weakest points in the book. In fact, his
appraisal of the dissenting opinion is very unfair to Sutherland. He
suggests that the distinguished Justice would rather see the country go
to "rack and ruin" than to concede that the contract clause was meaningless as applied to this emergency situation.27 In support of his
argument, the author cites a passage from Spencer's Social Statics
which is a justification for the elimination of the more unfit and weaker
members of society. There would appear to be at least three ready
answers to the author's rationalization: First, Herbert Spencer, to my
knowledge, was not sitting on the Supreme Court and did not write
the dissent in the Blaisdell case. That Spencer would have dissented
from the majority opinion in order to advance the idea of the "survival
under the circumstances to assure a fair hearing. See also Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173 (1947).
23. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
24. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
25. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (1843) (where a statute providing a stay of a
year was overthrown).
26. 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934).
27. P. 172.
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of the fittest" certainly does not mean that Sutherland was motivated
by the same reasons.
Secondly, the alternatives for Sutherland were not between judicially repealing the contract clause or letting the country go to "rack
and ruin." A close reading of the opinion discloses that Sutherland
would advocate a third alternative-that of amending the Constitution.
He clearly pointed out that provisions of the Constitution "remain
binding as the acts of the people in their sovereign capacity . . .until

they are amended or abrogated by the action prescribed by the authority
which created them . . .the remedy consists in repeal or amendment,

and not in false constructions." 28 Later opinions also disclose that
Sutherland preferred the remedy of amendment. In both the Carter
Coal case 29 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,3" he strongly advocated
amendment by prescribed methods rather than by judicial construction.
Finally, if Sutherland had actually thought that the result of his
position was to foreclose his country's survival, he no doubt would have
reappraised that position and gone along with the majority. Several
of his opinions make this abundantly clear, and the only apparent reason
for Paschal's not recognizing that fact is his pre-occupation with
justifying the constitutional developments of the New Deal period.
In United States v. Macintosh,3 ' Sutherland stated: "We are a nation
with a duty to survive."'3 2 National survival to Sutherland was an
absolute, overshadowing even the great principles of the Constitution
itself. From this philosophy came the case of United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.33 which will be discussed infra.
These points of disagreement with the author's conclusion are
mentioned not merely for the sake of argument. Ascribing undisclosed
reasons and motivations to a judge's actions is a delicate matter, and
one to be undertaken only when a writer is convinced of the soundness
of his position. This is particularly true with a biographer, whose
handling of his subject may play a great part in determining the subject's place in history. Hostility to the subject's views may easily lead
to superficiality, inaccuracy, and unfairness. Often a leading decision
becomes so well-established in our jurisprudence that we lose the ability
to perceive that it might have been decided differently. One should
always remember that a judge is not a legislator and has not a legis28. 290 U.S. 398, 451 (1934) (emphasis added).
29. Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

30. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
31. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
32. Id. at 625.
33. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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lator's freedom in making the law. He must operate within the framework of what he conceives to be the judicial process. Unless a writer is
careful, he may let a single act of "sinfulness" cloak with obscurity
3
a thick catalog of good deeds.

4

Uppermost in Sutherland's repertoire of good deeds stands an
opinion that probably will long endure-UnitedStates v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.3 5 There it was established that the government of the
United States is not limited in the field of foreign relations by the
Constitution. Its power in this realm derives not from the Constitution,
but from the United States' membership in the international community. The facts of the case were as follows: Defendant was indicted
for selling arms, in violation of a Congressional Joint Resolution and
a presidential proclamation, to a country involved in a Bolivian dispute.
To Sutherland the resolution was designed to affect a situation entirely
external to the United States and therefore was not to be judged by the
instrument designed to control internal affairs, i.e., the Constitution.
The crucial issue for Sutherland was the role of the United States in
international affairs. Sutherland thus reasoned that:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the
colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty
passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to
the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the
United States of America. .

. Sovereignty is never held in

suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great
Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed
to the Union ....
As a member of the family of nations, the
right and power of the United States . . . are equal to the

right and power of the other members of the international
family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely
sovereign." 30
The result of the case was to give the President a carte blanche in the
international sphere. While Sutherland may have been guilty of letting
the concept of national sovereignty obscure the inextricable connection
between internal and external affairs, many, including Mr. Paschal,
derive much comfort from the fact that there is no constitutional
restraint on this country's participation in world affairs. If that participation should in any measure contribute to the settlement of what now
appear to be insoluble international controversies and disputes, Mr.
34. See The Writing of Judicial Biography-A Symposium, 24

(1949).
35. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
36. Id. at 316-317.

IND.

L.J. 363
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Justice Sutherland will have won, and justly deserve, a place in the
hearts of all mankind.
Ford G. Lacey-

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

STUDY OF LAW.

By Bernard C. Gavit.*

Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1951. Pp. xvi, 388. $4.25.
The reviewer of a book of this sort, described by the author as
"not a law book" but a "book about law," must at the outset know the
author's purpose. Dean Gavit has designed this book for three groups
of readers: The first-year law student; the pre-law student; and the
layman with "abnormal curiosity to know and understand at least a
little about our legal system." 1 For the first group the book is designed
to help the student through the difficult orientation period. It will
assist the pre-law student with his decision concerning the study of law
and in this connection it is believed that an effort should be made to
bring the book to the attention of all those advising such students and
that its study should be recommended. Any layman with an "abnormal
curiosity" about law will find a reading of this book rewarding and
satisfying.
It is in no sense a reference book and, except for Chapter VIII,
is almost entirely without documentation. The author's lurking fear
that his "elementary" book would be thought "superficial" is not in the
least a likely judgment of any reader. Of course, it was necessary
to omit some important matters, and opinions may well differ in some
details, but there is nothing superficial in what is contained in the
volume. Furthermore, the avoidance of "doubts" and "exceptions"
is justified in a book about law.
Concerning decisions of inclusion and exclusion, I suspect the
chapter "What is Law" was the most difficult to write. With respect
to the subject matter of this chapter, determined controversy exists.
Dean Gavit contrasts the concept of law as it is used in science, economics, ethics and religion with "lawyer's law." In the latter, the place,
control and interplay of government makes considerations of expediency
and convenience necessary. In these matters his only purpose is "to
give the reader some insight into and some understanding of what law
T

LL.B., 1952, Indiana University.

* Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1. Preface, P. iii.

